In order to isolate and define the problems of applying a date to the origins of modern international society, it is first necessary to identify the nature of the beast – in other words: what exactly is International Society? This essay concurs with the English School in locating that definition somewhere between International Anarchy, which implies chaos among actors in a state of constant conflict, and International Community, which suggests overt harmony and cohesiveness. Lying in the Golidilocks zone – that is, not too disordered on the one hand and not too cosy on the other – International Society is constructed on the tenets put forward by Hedley Bull as an association of state actors with common interests and values who participate in the maintenance of international institutions. Having defined the terms of modern international society, the essay will proceed by locating its inception. Adam Watson identifies a series of historical loci, all of which could arguably connote the start of International Society. They are; the Greek city states, the city state system of Renaissance Italy, the anti-hegemonial Peace of Westphalia, the Concert System of Europe, the Treaty of Versailles, and the 20th Century’s twin superpower axis. Add to this the globalised, pluralist world stage of the 21st Century and the scale and scope of the question becomes apparent.
Peering back through the telescope of history, the observer can see cross-border interaction in civilisations as early as the ancient Egyptians, Indians and Chinese. However it was with the ancient Greeks five centuries BCE that the first real manifestation of what might be called International Society can be found. There were around 1,500 city states in Greece, the superpowers being Athens, Sparta and Corinth. These city states were bound by a common culture and religion and a view of outsiders – for example, the Persians – as barbarians. And significantly for the subject of this essay, they developed a political vocabulary which included the terms; ‘reconciliation’, ‘truce’, ‘alliance’, ‘arbitration’, ‘treaty’ and ‘peace’. However, as a mark against this era being the origin of International Society, there were no ambassadors to conduct relations, simply – as Martin Wight notes – a system involving local residents known as ‘proxeny’. International law did not exist for the ancient Greeks, either, with principles being upheld mainly through religious rules. Indeed, Zeus himself had custody of Treaties. This, as Harold Nicolson notes, showed that there was a ‘religious sanction mitigating against unrestrained barbarities analogous to our Geneva Convention’. Yet it must be said that while there were standards of conduct, little equality existed between states. For example, in the Melian Dialogue chronicled by Thucycdides, historian of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, Melos appealed for justice to the Athenians but was spurned by their invading forces who said, ‘the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak must accept what they have to accept.’ Hardly ‘societal’ behaviour. To find a more plausible model of such, the scholar must go forward two millennia.
The intervening centuries were a period of empire. The Greeks were superceded by the Macedonians, who in turn were succeeded by the Romans. Then came the theocracies of Latin Christendom in the west and Orthodox Christianity centred on Constantinople in the east. But nowhere to be found in the Middle Ages is an International Society based on Sovereign States. It was not until the late 15th Century and the dawn of the Italian City States that the seeds planted in ancient Greece peeped through as green shoots. Geoffrey Stern points to the development of polities under secular rulers who broke away from religious authority and Papal intervention. This was the age of Realism, raison d’etat and statecraft encapsulated by Machiavelli’s The Prince. Perhaps most convincingly for those arguing in favour of the Italian City-States System as being the origin of International Society, this period heralded the birth of the diplomatic system with career diplomats, embassies and diplomatic immunity. These diplomats had the power to represent and negotiate on behalf of their city state, but there was always Machiavelli’s last resort of subversion, assassination and finally war should their efforts fail. Which leads to another count in favour of the Italian era as the origin of international society – the inclination towards a balance of power system. Wars were not conducted in order to destroy an opponent, but rather to preserve that balance. But this essay argues that professional diplomacy and balance of power politics do not on their own constitute International Society. Their geographical scope at this time was too small, limited as it was to those city states of the Italian peninsula. Rather they represent a link between its medieval and modern conceptions. For a fully matured model the focus must move forward to immediately after the Thirty Years War which tore Europe apart in the first part of the 17th Century.
The Treaties of Westphalia brought to an end this religious conflict and in doing so, helped create the framework for a system of inter-state co-existence. For Hedley Bull and this essay, it marked the starting point of modern international society. The Westphalian system was built on four cornerstones. The first was secular sovereign statehood – the principle that a ruler was not subject to any higher authority. All states were equal and could expect to exist in a condition of non-intervention from other states. Secondly, states were expected to abide by a self-policing system of international law. As CAW Manning notes, by seeking sovereign status, a ruler indicated their consent to abide by these commonly agreed laws. Thirdly, came the full implementation of organised diplomacy on the lines of the Italian City State system. And the fourth cornerstone of Westphalia, was the promotion of ‘balance of power’ politics in which states adapted to ensure none of their number achieved the supremacy of hegemonial status. These seeds of state sovereignty and non-intervention can be seen to have evolved into the UN Charter and Geneva Conventions of today. And while acknowledging Martin Wight’s assertion that Westphalia merely marked its coming of age, this essay concurs with Bull et al, that modern international society can date its origins to 1648. At this point, it would be timely to look at David Held and Anthony McGrew’s contention that Westphalia merely established a normative trajectory for the shape of international society rather than a complete definition. Mention too must be made of Immanuel Wallerstein’s ‘Long Sixteenth Century’ – the period from 1450 to 1670 when, according to Wallerstein, the modern world system was established. His 220-year blanket does indeed cover the end of feudalism and the beginning of capitalism and a global structure we recognise today. But as Adam Watson reinforces, 1648 saw the birth of a ‘charter of a Europe permanently organised on an anti-hegemonial principle.’ But what of Watson’s subsequent watersheds for the possible starting point of modern international society?
The Concert of Europe – established following the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 – comprised the Great Power Coalition of Britain, France, Russia, Prussia and Austria and can be seen as a forerunner of the biggest ‘club’ of countries ever assembled – the present day’s United Nations. The Concert itself was a product of the rise of Nationalism in Europe and for FH Hinsley, it was Napoleon’s attempts to force the peoples of Europe to be free – to bring into being a Europe of nations rather than states – that marked the beginning of modern international society. But as a candidate for the start of modern international society, the essay argues that this locus offers no principle that the Peace of Westphalia had not already instituted.
A century later came Versailles – another international system built on the principles of self-determination and international law. Masterminded by US President Woodrow Wilson, it was intended to promote collective security and spawned the League of Nations. Evan Luard identifies 1918 as his beginning of modern international society, but this essay argues that, once again, it represents no more than a latterday development of Westphalia. The same can be said of the establishment of the United Nations immediately after the Second World War. Seismic in scale and influence though it is, the UN – as an organisation promoting state actors’ rights to self-determination and the upholding of international law – is in the same, albeit far larger, mould, as the post-Westphalian Europe of 1648.
Perhaps the biggest changes to the structure of global politics have taken place in the second half of the 20th Century. Robert Jackson highlights the ‘freezing and sanctifying’ of international boundaries, which can be seen as a double-edged sword. While discouraging acts of expansionist aggression this position is also a barrier to the reshuffling of boundaries in response to changing socio-cultural needs as witnessed in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The past 65 years have also seen international society evolve into a ‘world society’. The position of the state on the global stage has arguably been eroded by the growth of shared norms and values which pertain regardless of individuals’ citizenship. Such norms include human rights, the rebirth of minority and aboriginal groups and the rise of gender in world politics. Environmental concerns also cross boundaries with a new responsibility for those with the greatest capacity for pollution to clean up their acts. Note too the rapid expansion – alongside IGOs such as the UN, World Bank and Nato – of NGOs such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International. The role of MNCs – the largest 500 of which control two-thirds of world trade – is clearly of crucial significance to the changing face of international society too. For some, such as Held and McGrew, the modern international order of states only became truly global at the end of the 20th Century.
In conclusion, this essay argues that modern international society is resolutely state-based. Built on the principles of sovereignty, equality, legitimacy and diplomatic interaction, the world’s 202 states remain the pre-eminent actors in international politics. Indeed, sovereign status is sought by many nations (for example, Basques, Chechens and Palestinians) and while globalisation changes the look of the world, it does not alter this state-based mechanism at a fundamental level. As such, the main difficulty in dating the origin of modern international society is locating where this state system came into being. While the first evidence of state principles in action can be traced back to Ancient Greece and seen to have developed in the Italian City States System of the late 15th Century, this essay argues that they only truly came to fruition in the mid-17th Century at Westphalia. Subsequent mileposts – the Concert System of Europe, the Treaty of Versailles, the post 1945 peace and Cold War, and the globalization of the late 20th Century – saw no more than an enlargement or redefining of what went before. And because of that, it concurs with Hedley Bull et al, that while there are problems in dating the origins of modern international society, it can be pinned down to one year – 1648.
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