Realism | Failings of the pre-eminent paradigm in International Relations

By John Lee

The relentless struggle between self-interested actors for power and dominance under the prevailing condition of global anarchy. Here, in one sentence, is the core of Realism – the predominant paradigm for the study of states’ behaviour since long before International Relations was recognised as an academic discipline. Yet this apparently simple reduction disguises a multitude of problems that render Realism neither coherent nor convincing. This essay will argue that internal contradictions exist among the historical classifications of Realism and even between scholars within these sub-divisions. It will contend that Realism suffers from a lack of precision in determining what epistemological rules to follow; operates within a dubious moral framework; and, at the beginning of the pluralist 21st Century, does not account for the changing significance of the state in international relations. As world politics goes through the tectonic changes of globalization, the growth of transnational organisations such as the UN and Multi-National Corporations, the end of the Cold War and the prevalence of intra-state rather than inter-state conflicts particularly in the Global South, it will ask the question: is Realism still fit for purpose?

Fault lines within the Realist tradition of thought can be traced back two and a half millennia to the writings of Thucydides. As historian of the Peloponnesian wars between Athens and Sparta, he represented power politics as simply a reflection of human nature – a manifestation of the traits of ambition, anger, fear and suspicion entrenched in the biological make-up of the individual. This Classical view was revisited by Niccolo Machiavelli who asserted in The Prince (1532) that the thrust for power over others was the key to wise statecraft. Four centuries later, post-War Realist Hans J Morgenthau concurred. He stated that ‘the drives to live, to propagate, to dominate are common to all men’. Now enter the Structural Realists with a fundamental contradiction. While agreeing that international politics is a struggle for power, they contend that it is not human nature but the anarchical structure of the global system which fosters fear and suspicion. Such fear at a state level is highlighted by Jean-Jacques Rousseau who pointed to the ‘security dilemma’ in which one actor’s pursuit of security through increased military capability creates insecurity in rivals who proceed to build their own power through countermeasures. The result is an upward spiral of measure and countermeasure which diminishes the security of all. So, we ask the Realists: from where does this fear and suspicion at the base of your paradigm emanate – the individual or the state?

Divergence of view also thrives within the boundaries of Structural Realism. According to Kenneth Waltz, whose seminal text Theory of International Politics (1979) may be regarded as the starting point of Structural Realism, anarchy leads to a logic of self-help in which states seek to maximise their security not their levels of power. This theory, labelled Defensive Realism, clashes with the Offensive Realism of John Mearsheimer, who argues that states’ best hope of achieving peace is to acquire more power than anyone else. The ideal position, according to Mearsheimer, is to be the global hegemon. However, he goes on to admit that international hegemony is impossible (what about the United States?) and therefore the world is doomed to a perpetual condition of power competition.

Even policy recommendations following from Realist logic can be divergent. Realist thinkers were split on American intervention in Vietnam. Henry Kissinger supported such action while Hans Morgenthau was opposed to it on the grounds that US goals were unattainable without unreasonable moral liabilities and military risks. More recently, Realist thinkers united against war on Iraq. While the UN Security Council frantically negotiated in autumn 2002, 34 leading Realists signed an advert in the New York Times stating that war with Iraq was not in America’s national interest. Two years later, Mearsheimer – already described here as an Offensive Realist – and Stephen Walt developed that position by questioning why the US had abandoned its policy of deterrence which had been successful at avoiding full-blown conflict during the Cold War. They concluded by saying that the Bush administration did not have to fight the war and even if the war went well it would still have been unnecessary. If it went badly in terms of casualties and an increased risk of terrorism due to an escalation of hatred of America in the Islamic world, its architects would have even more to answer for. Compelling arguments indeed against war . . .  but from Realists? And while there is a nod towards a moral consideration, does it go far enough?

A convincing paradigm of human behaviour must have such a coherent moral dimension to succeed. To this end, Realism is found wanting. The arch Realist emphasises the ruthless nature of international life. These proponents of raison d’etat, or reason of state, align themselves with a dual moral standard – that is, one standard for individual citizens living within a state and a different standard for the state in its international relations. Cheating, lying and even killing are clearly deemed unacceptable for the individual but for a state guided by the ‘philosophy of necessity’ might be viewed as acceptable. As Hedley Bull – architect of the English School variant of Realism points out – classical Realists are putting into action the prescriptions advanced as far back as Machiavelli in The Prince, that it is for each state or ruler to pursue its own interest: the question of morality in international politics does not arise. Charles Krauthammer put it succinctly when he said that, for a national leader ‘thinking with one’s heart is a serious offence. Foreign policy is not social work’. But surely in a civilised world, foreign policy should have an element of ‘social work’. Not so, said Hobbes. According to him, individuals trade their liberty for a guarantee from the state of security. Only after security has been established can civil society begin.

E.H. Carr is similarly sceptical of idealistic notions. After witnessing the rise of dictatorships in Japan, Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union in the inter-war period, Carr attacked the idealism of US President Woodrow Wilson’s ‘new world order’. In The Twenty Years Crisis, he dismissed as ‘utopianism’ Wilson’s view after the human catastrophe of the First World War that future conflict could be avoided by open diplomacy, anti-war legislation, self-determination and disarmament. Again, the emphasis from Carr was on competition, conflict and coercion. So we can see that from Thucydides to Machiavelli to Carr to Morgenthau, Realists paint a grim picture of the world. Forget peace and co-operation, international politics is – in Hobbes’ words – ‘a war of all against all.’

Yet this should not be the case, say Realism’s critics. According to Pluralist thinkers such as Keohane and Nye, the Realist emphasis on the state is oversimplified and outdated. At the start of the 21st Century, we live in a complex, interdependent world. States can no longer control the flow of information, goods and people across their borders or entirely protect their citizens from nuclear attack, terrorism and environmental hazards emanating from outside their frontiers. Realism has not kept up with the growth of influence of Multinational Corporations. The largest 500 MNCs control two thirds of world trade so must, it can be contended, be regarded as significant actors. Neither has Realism adapted to the increasing role in international relations of other non-state actors – such as Islamic Jihad – which envisages transnational conflict rather than wars between states.

On the growing problem of intra-state (as opposed to inter-state) wars, Realists’ have been forced to adapt in order to find solutions. Structural Realists, such as Waltz and Mearsheimer, maintain that when the sovereign authority of the state collapses, the resulting internal conflicts happen for the same reasons as international ones. So the resulting anarchy inside a country – for example, the war-ravaged African state of Somalia – is seen as analogous to global anarchy among state actors. It is natural, says Barry Posen, for warring factions to seek security as a first priority. As on the international stage, this results in a security dilemma born of fear and suspicion. 

And from a more optimistic viewpoint, where in the Realist paradigm is there room for co-operative thought? After all, 192 of the world’s states are members of the same club – the United Nations – which aims to foster collective peace and security, champion human rights and self-determination and bring about cooperative solutions to economic, social and environmental problems. Yet Realists reject the idea of entrusting national interest to international organisations or law. Co-operation, mutual trust and a helping hand where needed? Forget it.

In conclusion, this essay argues that the Realist paradigm is riven with contradictions and inconsistency. There is no united theory as to the source of the fear and suspicion which drives war and the search for power. Does it derive from human nature, as classical Realists such as Machiavelli would argue, or is it, as Rousseau would assert, a result of global anarchy?  Observe too, the structural Realist disharmony over whether it really is power that state actors seek in the first place. Offensive Realist Mearsheimer says yes it is; defensive Realist Waltz says no, security is the core concern. At another level, this essay questions whether Realists are consistently inclined towards conflict, anyway? Kissinger wanted U.S. intervention in Vietnam while Morgenthau believed such action untenable. As well as this lack of consistency, there is a glaring failure by Realists to keep up with the changing framework of international relations. Globalisation as a paradigm shift is disregarded, yet anyone seeking to understand the 21st Century world ignores the growth in transnational co-operation and interdependence – exemplified by the UN, MNCs, aid organisations and others – at their peril. Finally, the lack of a moral dimension is arguably Realism’s greatest failing. According to the paradigm’s doctrine, people are naturally selfish with an instinctive lust for power and desire to dominate others. At state level, this dictates that each actor must acquire sufficient military might to deter attacks by rivals and to influence others. Yet surely in our post-Enlightenment global ‘village’, humankind must be able to do better than resort to warfare to solve its differences. How can Hobbes’ grim assessment that international politics is ‘a war of all against all’ still be considered right three and a half centuries later? This essay concludes that Hobbes – who made his doom-laden declarations at a time when life was ‘nasty, brutish and short’ – is not right, that humankind has progressed to a higher level of international discourse and that as a framework for understanding and shaping relations between actors on the global stage, Realism is, indeed, neither coherent nor convincing.